This paper studies two roles that long-term nominal interest rates can play in the conduct of monetary policy in a New Keynesian model. The first allows long-term rates to enter the reaction function of the monetary authority. The second considers the possibility of using long-term rates as instruments of policy. In both cases a unique rational expectations equilibrium exists. Reacting to movements in long yields does not improve macroeconomic performance as measured by the loss function. Long-term rates, however, turn out to be better instruments of monetary policy than short-term rates when the concern for inflation volatility is high.
Introduction
Long-term interest rates play a central and potentially important role in the conduct of monetary policy. The transmission mechanism of monetary policy is traditionally perceived as going from a short-term nominal interest rate -generally the operating instrument of monetary policy-to a long-term real interest rate that can influence aggregate demand.
Recently, there have been proposals involving the explicit use of nominal longterm interest rates for the conduct of monetary policy. These proposals involve, either a reaction to a long yield, or more radically, the use of a long-term rate as the operating instrument of monetary policy. 1 To the extent that the use of long-term rates itself changes the very nature of the transmission mechanism, it is not at all obvious that a central bank could implement such policies, or even, benefit from doing so. My goal is to study the feasibility and desirability of such proposals: a) reacting to a long-term rate; and b) setting a long-term rate. 2 
Reacting to a long-term rate
If the predominant force behind movements in long-term yields is due to expectations of future inflation, then a monetary authority that wants to keep inflation under control might be interested in the use of a monetary policy rule that includes a long-term rate as an additional variable to which it can respond. Ireland (1996) suggests that the expected inflation term is responsible for most of the observed movements in U.S. long-term yields; convincingly, Goodfriend (1993) argues that in order to establish and maintain credibility during the period 1979 to 1992, the Federal Reserve reacted to the information in long-term nominal interest rates about long-term inflationary expectations; McCallum (1994) shows that a monetary policy rule that responds to the prevailing level of the spread between a long-term rate and a short-term rate can rationalize an important empirical failure of the expectations hypothesis; and Mehra (1996, 1997, 1999) suggest that the federal funds rate reacted to movements in a long-term bond yield in the 1979-1997 period. Such behavior by the central bank, however, raises two important issues.
First, because the theory of the term structure that obtains from optimizing behavior is the expectations hypothesis, a monetary policy rule that implies a response to a long-term rate begs the question of whether or not a unique rational expectations equilibrium (REE) can be achieved. The combined power of the expectations hypothesis and such a policy rule may easily give rise to self-fulfilling prophecies originating in the determination of the yield curve, and may render such a rule infeasible. 3 What are the conditions that guarantee uniqueness of the REE when the central bank's actions depend on the level of a long-term interest rate in addition to inflation and the output gap?
Second, if the conditions that ensure a unique REE exist, one wonders if such an interaction between short-term and long-term interest rates is desirable according to a standard loss function criterion.
To study these questions I propose a modification of a standard Taylor-rule that adds a long-term rate as an additional variable to which the central bank adjusts its short-term rate. In a standard New Keynesian model, I show that the regions of uniqueness for such rules are large and empirically plausible. I find, however, that reacting to a long-term rate does not improve the performance of the central bank relative to the standard Taylor-rule, regardless of the maturity length in question.
Setting a long-term rate
More radically, long-term nominal interest rates might be used as instruments of monetary policy. 4 If long-run rates of inflation and levels of short-term nominal interest rates get sufficiently low, monetary policy can become ineffective in its attempts to combat an economic recession. Usually the yield curve slopes up, suggesting the possibility of further stimulating aggregate demand through longer-term rates once short-term rates hit their zero bound. 5 Clouse, Henderson, Orphanides, Small and Tinsley (2003) discuss -inspired by the zero bound problem -several aspects of the possibility that the monetary authority intervenes in longer-term treasury securities markets. Such interventions may not only have a direct impact, but also an indirect influence through expectations about the future path of the shortterm rate.
But even if the short rate is far from the zero bound -even in 'normal' circumstances -it is not a priori clear that the central bank can effectively set a long-term rate. It seems therefore interesting, to study the properties of long-term rates as instruments of monetary policy -even if abstracting from the zero bound. In particular, I study equilibrium determinacy under policy rules that set a nominal interest rate other than the short-term rate. For a large set of values a unique REE exists. Moreover, when the central bank is mainly concerned with the volatility of inflation, long-term rates outperform the traditional short-term rate in the class of Taylor-type rules.
One might initially suspect that a unique REE will not arise if the central bank decides to set, for instance, a two-period nominal interest rate. The reason is that, in a context in which the expectation hypothesis holds true, there will exist infinite combinations for the one-period interest rate that satisfy the central bank's setting of the two-period rate. Notice that abstracting from a term premium and default risk, the two-period rate is an average of the current one-period rate and the current expectation of the one-period rate next period.
This argument strongly suggests that a unique equilibrium would not exist when the central bank uses a rule for which the operating instrument is some longer-term rate. Imagine for a moment that this is indeed the case and recall that almost all of the modern dynamic discrete-time models of monetary economics are based on a quarterly frequency. So, in theory the operating instrument is a 3-month interest rate, whereas the actual instrument, in most developed economies, is an overnight rate. The inability to map the theoretical operating instrument with the actual one would be a damning result. This suspicion, however, turns out to be incorrect; large and plausible regions of the policy-parameter space for long-term interest rate rules yield a unique REE.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 discusses determinacy of the REE under the proposed monetary policy rules and their implications for the dynamic behavior of the economy. Section 4 studies the performance of these alternative rules against two benchmarks: the robust optimal policy rule and the standard Taylor-rule. Section 5 concludes.
The model
The model is a standard New Keynesian model with an extended set of equilibrium conditions in order to allow for an explicit consideration of the term structure of interest rates. Instead of working through the details of the derivation, I present the key log-linear aggregate relationships. 6 The aggregate demand schedule implies that the current level of the output gap, x t , depends on the expected future level of the output gap and the one-period real interest rate as given by
where R 1,t is the one-period nominal interest rate, π t stands for the inflation rate during period t, the parameter σ > 0 governs inter-temporal substitution, a t is a technology shock with persistence governed by ρ, and g t is a preference shock with persistence governed by φ and size µ g .
It can be shown that the theory of the term structure of interest rates in this model is the expectations hypothesis. And so, the nominal interest rate at t associated with a zero-coupon bond that promises to pay one dollar at the end of period t + i − 1 is determined by
Firms operate under monopolistic competition in the goods market and Calvoprice stickiness. Factor markets are competitive and goods are produced with a constant returns to scale technology. One can show that the new Phillips curve is
where v t is a cost-push shock with size µ v . The household's discount factor, β, is restricted to lie between 0 and 1, and λ is strictly positive. To close the model, I need to specify the behavior of the monetary authority. The standard case characterizes monetary policy as a commitment to the following Taylor-type rule
where b t is an i.i.d. monetary policy shock whose size is governed by µ b .
In the case in which the monetary authority adds a long-term rate as an additional variable to which it reacts, the policy rule is
Throughout the paper, policy rules that allow a reaction to a long-term rate will be called type-1 rules. I study policy rules of type-1 for maturities 2, 4, 12, 20 and 40, which for a quarterly frequency corresponds to a term structure composed of bonds with maturities 6 months, 1 year, 3 years, 5 years and 10 years respectively. When the central bank uses a long-term rate as the operating instrument, monetary policy follows a rule of the form,
Policy rules for which the instrument of monetary policy is other than the short-term rate will be labeled type-2 rules. 7 As before, the selected term structure for type-2 rules is 2, 4, 12, 20 and 40. It is worth emphasizing that to properly close the model when the central bank uses either a type-1 or a type-2 rule of maturity i, as given by equation (5) or (6) respectively, one has to add the set of equations given by equation (2) up to maturity i. 8 Finally, the exogenous variables of the model behave according to
where the parameters are restricted as follows: |ρ| < 1, |φ| < 1,|θ| < 1; and the shocks ε a t ,ε b t ,ε g t and ε v t are i.i.d., with zero mean, and standard deviations σ ε a ,σ ε b ,σ ε g , and σ ε v respectively.
The parameters β, λ,and σ are fixed throughout the study. These parameters are set to 0.99, 0.14, and 1 respectively. The value for λ implies an expected pricecontract length of one year. 9 The value for σ is consistent with log-utility. The shocks associated with the parameters ρ,φ and θ are known in the literature to be highly persistent innovations. 10 For this reason their values are set to 0.95. Finally the standard deviation of the remaining shocks are set as follows. The standard deviation of the technology shock, σ ε a , is set to 0.7 following Cooley and Prescott (1995) . Then, in the case of a Taylor-rule with τ = 0.5, α = 0.6 and δ = 0.0009, the values of µ b ,µ g and µ v are chosen so as to approximate the volatility of the 7 Equation (6) is similar to a standard Taylor rule except for the interest rate that is being set by the central bank. As interest rates of various maturities are linked by the expectations hypothesis, any outcome produced by a type-1 or type-2 rule, could alternatively be obtained using some other, but more complicated, rule for the short-term rate. 8 If the central bank follows the standard Taylor-rule, it is possible to solve the three-equation model first, and to then use the reduced-form expression for the short rate to compute interest rates of longer maturities. But, if either a type-1 or type-2 rule is used, all interest rates up to the highest maturity involved in the rule need to be explicitly incorporated into the model to calculate its solution. In other words, the equations of the yield curve up to maturity i are not redundant for the determination of the equilibrium. 9 It can be shown using the full blown model that λ = (1 − ϕ)(1 − βϕ)(1 + η)/ϕ. Here ϕ is the parameter that governs the degree of price stickness and η the parameter that governs the elasticity of labor supply. The value of η is set to 0.6 as suggested by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988) so as to match microeconometric estimates of labor supply elasticities. An expected pricecontract length of one year implies a value of 0.75 for ϕ.
10 See Cooley and Prescott (1995) and Ireland (2004) .
output gap, the short-term interest rate and inflation in the data. 11 The output gap is constructed as the log difference between the seasonally adjusted quarterly real GDP and real potential quarterly GDP taken from the U.S. Congress: Congressional Budget Office. Inflation is measured as the quarterly change of the GDP Implicit Price Deflator and the short-term interest rate is taken to be the 3-month Fama and Bliss zero-coupon bond yield from the CRSP data.
Equilibrium determinacy
Under appropriate identifications, the model can be written in matrix form as,
where s t = ( z t p t ) . z t is a m×1 vector of predetermined variables at t; p t is a n× 1 vector of non-predetermined variables at t; and v t is a k × 1 vector of exogenous variables.
Let¯n be the number of eigenvalues of K outside the unit circle. There are three cases to consider. If¯n = n, there is a unique equilibrium solution; if¯n > n, an equilibrium solution does not exist; and if¯n < n, there is an infinite number of equilibrium solutions. 12 Rules that support multiple equilibria can be problematic. A rule that implies indeterminacy is consistent with a large set of equilibria, including ones in which the fluctuations of endogenous variables can be very large relative to the size of fluctuations in the fundamental shocks. 13 In general, variables for which there may be very large fluctuations due to non-fundamental disturbances include those that enter the loss function. So, some of the equilibria consistent with such rule are likely to be less desirable, in terms of the loss function, than the unique equilibrium associated with any rule capable of supporting it. For these reasons, the normative analysis restricts its attention to rules consistent with a unique equilibrium.
Type-1 rules: Reacting to long-term rates
In this subsection I study the conditions that support a unique REE for the class of type-1 rules given by R 1,t = τR 1,t−1 + απ t + δx t + γR i,t . 14 Figure 1 shows the 11 Then σ ε b ,σ ε g , and σ ε v are set to 1. 12 Note that the set of determinacy results is independent of the properties of the stochastic processes. See Blanchard and Kahn (1980) and Klein (2000) for more details. 13 See Bernanke and Woodford (1997) for more details on a sunspot equilibrium. See also Woodford (2003, chapter 4).
14 In general, I have computed the results for a wide range of parameter values, but report only a subset to illustrate my findings. Matlab and Mathematica files containing additional figures are regions of uniqueness for given values of τ and δ in the space of α and γ. 15 A number of interesting features of this type of policy rule are worth highlighting. The critical contour, for which the crucial eigenvalue of K is one, has a downward and an upward sloping part in each case.
The downward sloping portion of the contour reveals that there is a trade-off, in terms of assuring a unique equilibrium, between the reaction to current inflation (α) and the reaction to the long-term nominal interest rate (γ). In a close neighborhood of the downward sloping part of the contour a condition of the form (τ+α+γ > 1) is necessary and sufficient for determinacy, regardless of the maturity length in question. This condition can be viewed as a generalized version of the Taylorprinciple: that the nominal short-term rate should rise, in the long-run, more than one-for-one with the rate of inflation. The intuition behind this result is simple. Take equations (1) and (2) to write R 2,t as follows.
The above expression shows that by reacting to R 2,t , the monetary authority is implicitly reacting to the average expected path of inflation in the following two periods. This explains why, in a close neighborhood of the downward sloping part of the contour, the Taylor-principle takes the form of a more general condition (α + τ + γ > 1) as opposed to the standard one (α + τ > 1). The central bank can trade-off its reaction to inflation with its reaction to the long rate; because the nominal long-term rate incorporates expectations of future inflation. The upward sloping section of the contour shows, however, that for given α and τ, as γ becomes 'too large', the policy rule is unable to produce a unique outcome. To gain intuition as to why the contour slopes upwards -and to why the Taylor-principle is no longer sufficient-recall that according to the expectations hypothesis, R 2,t can also be written as
The problem is that a 'too large' value of γ allows self-fulfilling expectations to take place. To see why, observe that expectations that interest rates will be high become self-fulfilling, because the expectations of high short-term rates in the future causes long-term rates to rise, leading the monetary authority to raise short-term rates. Thus, in this case the monetary authority validates the initial expectation that short-term rates will be high. In this region, a higher value of γ requires a stronger available upon request. 15 Figure 1 shows regions of uniqueness for R 4 ,R 12 ,R 20 , and R 40 . The region looks similar for R 2 . Uniqueness response of the short-term rate to inflation in order to avoid the possibility of selffulfilling expectations. Therefore, α+τ+γ > 1 is no longer a sufficient conditionbut it remains necessary -for uniqueness. In this respect the Taylor-principle breaks down for type-1 rules. Figure 1 shows that as we move towards policy rules that involve longer maturity rates, the upward sloping part of the critical contour increases its slope. So, for a given value of α, it is possible to ensure unique solutions with even higher values of γ as the maturity lengthens. The further apart in terms of maturity that interest rates in the policy rule are, the steeper the slope of the contour is. When monetary policy reacts to very long-term rates, expectations can become self-fulfilling, but only if the reaction of the short-term rate to this very long-term rate is sufficiently strong; if it is sufficient to feed through the term structure with enough force to move the very long-rate in a self-validating manner. So, if τ+α+γ > 1 is satisfied, for given values of the other parameters, the longer the maturity of the interest rate in a type-1 rule, the larger the value of γ that supports a unique solution of the system.
For any type-1 rule, in the upward sloping part of the critical contour, higher values of the reaction to output (δ) extend the region of uniqueness and permit higher values of γ. This occurs because a positive reaction to R i is equivalent to a negative reaction to the current output gap. To see this take equation (5) for i equal to two, and replace R 2,t with its Fisher decomposition to obtain the equivalent policy rule
The expression above shows that higher values of δ allow for higher values of γ without implying a negative reaction to the current output gap. 16 
Type-2 rules: Long-term rates as instruments
Next, I study determinacy for the class of rules given by R i,t = τR i,t−1 + απ t + δx t . Figure 2 shows the regions in α -δ space in which a unique REE exists for τ = 1/2. Significant regions of the policy-parameter space produce a unique REE. The regions of determinacy, for the most part, remain unchanged whatever the maturity of the interest rate. Interestingly, for δ = 0, the Taylor-principle holds for these longer-term instruments 17 : that is, if δ = 0, determinacy with type-2 rules requires α + τ > 1 for all i. 18 16 One can show that in the standard case (that is with a policy rule of the form R 1,t = τR 1,t−1 + απ t + δx t ) there are multiple equilibria so long as δ < 0. 17 Strictly speaking, in general the condition α + τ > 1 is not necessary for achieving uniqueness of the REE for type-2 rules or even for the standard Taylor-rule. This can be seen in Figure 2 because the relevant contour is not exactly vertical. In fact, for low enough values of λ uniqueness can be achieved with δ > 0 even if α = τ = 0. For the chosen calibration, I refer to the almost verticality of the relevant contours as an approximate Taylor-principle condition. 18 In empirically plausible regions of the policy-space this approximate version of Taylor-principle generalizes to maturities other than one. Further exploration in α -τ space, however, shows that the Taylor-principle can break down but for large and implausible values of τ. For example, the critical contour for the type-2 rule for R 20 can slope up, in α -τ space, for values of τ greater than 2.5. 
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Uniqueness
The general result that a unique REE exists when the monetary authority sets an interest rate of maturity other than one is somewhat surprising in light of the intuition I have discussed previously. Consider, for example, the case in which the central bank decides to set R 2,t . Initially, one might think that a unique equilibrium would not be feasible since the expectations hypothesis gives infinite combinations of the short-term rate that would satisfy the bank's setting of R 2,t . The expectations hypothesis dictates that R 2,t be determined by 1 2 (R 1,t + E t R 1,t+1 ). And, at first sight, one chosen value for R 2,t could be achieved by infinitely many paths for R 1 ; and so, uniqueness of the REE could not be attained.
Clearly, this is not the case. To see why, remember that the expectations hypothesis says that long-term rates are determined by the expected future path of the short-term rate during the maturity horizon in question. Thus, it makes sense to think that short-term rates 'determine' the level of long-term rates. It is important, however, to realize that the expectations hypothesis works in the opposite direction as well. To see this formally consider equation (2) for R 2,t and rewrite it as a first-order, stochastic, difference equation in R 1 .
Advance the equation one period and substitute it back to obtain R 1,t = 2R 2,t − 2E t R 2,t+1 + E t R 1,t+2 .
One can repeat this operation many times and note that in a stable equilibrium lim j→∞ E t R 1,t+j = 0 to get the following expression:
Equation (9) uncovers why the previous intuition is incorrect. A uniquely expected path for the two-period rate, as given by equation (9), determines in a unique manner the current level of the one-period rate. In general, the expression of the relevant expected path for an interest rate of maturity i necessary to determine the current level of the nominal one-period rate is given by
Equation (10) generalizes the argument for interest rates of any term. Thus, whatever the maturity of the interest rate chosen as instrument, if the monetary policy rule supports a unique outcome, then the uniquely expected path of the instrument uniquely determines the current level of interest rates of longer as well as shorter maturities. The result that uniqueness can be supported, even when the central bank decides to use as its instrument an interest rate other than the very short-term rate, is, I think, very important, because -on a somewhat subtle level-it supports the use of models at various frequencies without hiding a problematic inconsistency. If, to the contrary, determinacy were to be a sole attainable property of rules that use the very short-term rate, results from quarterly models would just not hold in monthly models. Although models are usually studied at a quarterly frequency, sometimes the calibration is done at a monthly or annual frequency.
Without taking a stand on whether time is continuous or discrete, it should almost go without saying that real world economies occur (at least) at a daily frequency. Discrete monetary models are typically studied at a quarterly frequency without an explicit concern on whether or not the model short-term rate (a 3-month rate) would determine a unique level of the current overnight rate. This result provides not only a theoretical foundation for mapping the model short-term rate to the actual one, but also for interpreting the results of models of different frequencies.
This result also highlights an important aspect of the inner-workings of the expectations hypothesis of the yield curve. Typically, we think about monetary policy determining the short-term rate and then private expectations together with noarbitrage conditions in financial markets pinning down long-term rates. The ability to set a long-term rate and simultaneously achieve a unique equilibrium uncovers that the causality of this mechanism can very well be reversed: if monetary policy determines a long-rate, then similarly private expectations together with noarbitrage conditions in financial markets pin down short-term rates.
Dynamics
It seems interesting to study the way in which the economy responds to shocks under representative type-1 and type-2 rules versus a standard Taylor-rule. Figures 3 and 4 show impulse responses of inflation and the output gap to a monetary-policy shock and a cost-push shock for a standard Taylor-rule and for type-1 and type-2 rules involving R 12 and R 40 respectively. The parameters remain fixed across rules to capture the effects implied by their maturity dimension.
A number of interesting features arise from these comparisons. The qualitative responses of inflation and the output gap are the same in each case as those generated by a standard Taylor-rule. A contractionary monetary-policy shock reduces on impact both inflation and output, while an adverse cost-push shock increases inflation and decreases output. These results suggest that type-1 and type-2 rules do not imply 'strange' responses to the disturbances that hit the economy. Also, observe that the size of the responses is significantly affected by the type of rule. In particular, in response to a cost-push shock both type-1 and type-2 rules have inflation deviating by less and output by more than in the standard Taylor-rule case.
An adverse monetary-policy shock produces a larger contraction for inflation and output the longer the maturity of the instrument interest rate. This is because the size of the monetary-policy shock changes across policy rules. That is, a onestandard deviation of b t attached to a type-2 rule for R 40 raises the one-period nominal interest rate by more than a one-standard deviation of b t in a standard Taylorrule. For this reason the size of the monetary-policy shock (µ b ) is set to zero in all policy rules for the normative analysis that follows. 19 The impulse responses suggest that the dynamic behavior of the economy is significantly affected by the choice of policy rule. Different rules have distinct trade-offs between inflation and output deviations in response to a cost-push shock. This shock plays a key role in the conduct of monetary policy because it presents the monetary authority with a trade-off between output and inflation stabilization. Following Giannoni and Woodford (2002) , I construct a robust and optimal policy rule that serves as a natural benchmark for evaluating the performance of type-1 and type-2 rules. The rule brings about the optimal equilibrium pattern of responses to shocks and yields a unique REE. The objective of the monetary authority is to minimize the expected value of a loss given by
Optimal monetary policy rules
where the bank's discount rate, β, is the same as in equation (3) and the period-loss takes the form
The parameters ω x and ω R are strictly positive and govern the relative concern for output and short-term nominal interest rate variability. To obtain the robust and optimal rule, the monetary authority minimizes equation (11) subject to equations (1) and (3). This minimization achieves a time path for the short-term rate, {R 1,t } ∞ t=0 , that minimizes the central bank's objective and simultaneously satisfies the structural equations at each point in time. One can obtain a monetary policy rule consistent with the optimal allocation of the form
As Giannoni and Woodford (2002) show, commitment to this rule implies a unique REE as well as an optimal response to the economy's shocks. Note that the optimization is not performed over some parametric set of policy rules (such as the Taylor-rule). Instead, the approach consists of characterizing the optimal response to shocks by taking the structural equations as constraints, and then finding the policy rule that generates such an equilibrium. Any rule constrained to belong to a given set of rules performs worse than this optimal rule. Hence, equation (13) gives a lower bound for assessing the performance of both type-1 and type-2 rules. The standard Taylor-rule, equation (4), is a particular case of both a type-1 rule with γ set to zero, and a type-2 rule with i set to one. So, for reference, I also examine outcomes based on the standard Taylor-rule; and take this as a second benchmark. Table 1 shows values of the loss function and its components for the optimal rule, equation (13) , the standard Taylor-rule, equation (4), and type-1 rules, for ω R set to 0.1. 20 Reacting to movements in nominal long-term rates does not yield significant gains. As expected, type-1 rules are no worse than the standard Taylor-rule. Not only do type-1 rules achieve a value of the loss function which is identical to that of the standard Taylor-rule, but also mostly identical variances.
Optimal type-1 rules
Elsewhere in the literature, others have proposed including other asset prices in the Taylor-rule, such as stock prices and housing prices because they capture signs of future inflation. To the extent that long-term nominal interest rates capture future inflation, the results suggest that such a reaction neither worsens nor improves the 20 Notice that
). So that minimizing J is equivalent to minimizing a weighted average of the variances as given by
). And since 
instead. This is the loss function reported in all tables and used for the computations. performance of the central bank relative to a standard Taylor-rule, for which γ is set to zero. 21 Filardo (2000) and Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) do not find a strong case for including asset prices in monetary policy rules as well.
Since there are no significant gains in reacting to movements in longer-term rates, I do not investigate any further the behavior of type-1 rules under alternative calibrations for ω x and ω R . Table 2 shows the value of the loss function and its components for the optimal rule, equation (13) , the Taylor-rule, equation (4), and type-2 rules, equation (6) , for different values of ω x and a value of 0.1 for ω R .
Optimal type-2 rules
When the concern for the output variance is relatively low, type-2 rules based on rates of longer maturities generally perform better than the Taylor-rule. For example, when ω x equals 0.05, all type-2 rules except the one based on R 40 do better than the Taylor-rule, with the R 12 rule being the best among these. Also, note that a type-2 rule based on R 12 generates a lower variance for R 1 and higher variances for inflation and output relative to the optimal rule, but lower variances of inflation and output relative to the Taylor-rule.
When the concern for output volatility increases to 0.1, the best among the type-2 rules shown is that which is based on the 5-year rate. Inspection of Table 2 reveals that in this case the relevant gain comes from the ability of this R 20 rule to generate a lower variance of inflation. Observe that when ω x equals 0.01, 0.05 or 0.1 (that is, when the concern for output deviations is relatively low) the variance of the short-term rate increases with the maturity of the interest rate in the rule. For these parameter values, type-2 rules yield a higher variance of the short-term rate than that of the Taylor-rule. This property, however, is not preserved when the concern for output deviations increases to 1 3 or to 1. Table 3 reproduces the results of Table 2 but this time with ω R set to 1. With this greater aversion to the variance of the short-term interest rate, the variance of R 1 is reduced in all cases and for all rules. In Table 3 , for all values of ω x considered, the variance of the short-term rate achieved by type-2 rules is lower than it is for the optimal rule case and for the Taylor-rule.
A comparison of Table 2 and Table 3 shows that when the concern for the variance of output is relatively low the optimal type-2 rule (in terms of the maturity of the interest rate) is sensitive to the value of ω R . For example, when ω x equals 0.1 and ω R equals 0.1, the best rule is that based on R 20 . When ω x equals 0.1 and ω R equals 1, however, the best rule is that based on R 12 . Despite these differences in the maturity length, Tables 2 and 3 show an interesting pattern. When the relative concern for output volatility is low, medium-and long-term rate rules perform better than the Taylor-rule and when the concern for the output variance is high the Taylor-rule turns out to be better. Thus, the best rule depends on the parameters that determine the preferences of the monetary authority. Tables 2 and 3 reveal the presence of two different kinds of trade-offs between the variance of inflation and the variance of output. The first is the well-known Taylor-curve trade-off that arises as ω x varies. For all rules considered, as ω x rises, the central bank generates a lower variance for output at the expense of a higher one for inflation.
The second trade-off between the variance of output and the variance of inflation shows up in terms of maturities. Notice that a trade-off between the output and inflation variance appears for given values of ω x and ω R as we move along the maturity dimension of the class of type-2 rules. This trade-off, however, is not working in the same direction in all cases. For example, it is not always the case that when the maturity length of the instrument increases, one observes a lower variance of inflation at the expense of a higher one for output. Table 4 reports the percentage deviation of the loss from the robust optimal rule's loss for values of σ above and below unity. In spite of numerical differences, the general pattern is robust to variations in this parameter: medium-term rate rules perform better than the short-term rate if the concern for the variance of inflation is high, but the short-term rate outperforms if the concern for the variance of the output gap is high. One further feature of type-2 rules is worth highlighting. Compared to the standard Taylor-rule, they appear to be more forgiving of deviations from their optimal setting. An example of this is provided in Figure 5 , which shows the behavior of the loss function as we depart from the optimal value of one of the parameters in the policy rule (holding the other parameters at their optimal values). For this particular set of preferences the Taylor-rule happens to outperform type-2 rules. Even so, the loss function appears to be flatter for type-2 rules. What Figure 5 illustrates is that it seems relatively less costly for the central bank to deviate from the optimal values of τ,α, and δ using the type-2 rule for R 12 , as opposed to deviations from the best form of the Taylor-rule. This flatness of type-2 rules is potentially beneficial for policy makers with some uncertainty about the optimal parameters of a rule.
Conclusion
In this paper I have studied the implications of using long-term nominal interest rates in two types of monetary policy rules. Under the first, type-1 rules, the monetary authority adjusts the short rate in response to movements in some long-term yield as well as output and inflation. There are plausible regions of the policy pa- rameter space for which a unique REE arises under such policy rules. But if the reaction to the long rate is 'too' strong such rules fail to uniquely determine the equilibrium. And the normative analysis shows that there are no significant gains from using type-1 rules in terms of reducing the value of the loss function. Under the second use the monetary authority conducts policy according to a type-2 rule, which is like a Taylor-rule but with the short rate replaced by a longerterm rate. There are a number of interesting aspects of this proposal.
First, large regions of the policy parameter space exist where a unique REE obtains. Those policy parameters that yield a unique REE can be characterized, for the most part, as satisfying a generalized and approximate version of the Taylorprinciple -namely, that the long-run reaction of the instrument to movements in inflation should exceed unity.
Second, type-2 rules can be shown to be better under certain central bank preferences than the standard Taylor-rule. In particular, when the relative concern for inflation variability is high, medium-or long-term interest rate rules turn out to yield a better outcome.
Third, even when preferences are such that optimal use of a Taylor-rule outper-forms type-2 rules, the latter seem to be more forgiving of 'mistakes' in setting the parameters of the rule. Recently Andres, Lopez-Salido, and Nelson (2004) have extended the New Keynesian model by explicitly considering time-varying risk premia on longer-term bonds and by introducing portfolio adjustment costs that give longer-term rates an additional role in the monetary transmission mechanism. It would be interesting to study the performance of type-1 and type-2 rules in that extended environment. Such a possibility is left for future research. 
